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Effects of a corrupt source on the dynamics of simultaneous move strategic games are analyzed
both for classical and quantum settings. The corruption rate dependent changes in the payoffs and
strategies of the players are observed. It is shown that there is a critical corruption rate at which
the players lose their quantum advantage, and that the classical strategies are more robust to the
corruption in the source. Moreover, it is understood that the information on the corruption rate of
the source may help the players choose their optimal strategy for resolving the dilemma and increase
their payoffs. The study is carried out in two different corruption scenarios for Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Samaritan’s Dilemma, and Battle of Sexes.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a
a. Introduction: Classical game theory has a very
general scope, encompassing questions and situations
that are basic to all of the social sciences [1]. There
are three main ingredients of a game which is to be a
model for real life situations [1]: The first of these is the
rational players (decision makers) who share a common
knowledge. The second is the strategy set which con-
tains the feasible actions the players can take, and the
third one is the payoff which are given to the players as
their profit or benefit when they apply a specific action
from their strategy set. When rational players interact
in a game, they will not play dominated strategies, but
will search for an equilibrium. One of the important con-
cepts in game theory is that of Nash equilibrium (NE) in
which each player’s choice of action is the best response
to the actions taken by the other players. In an NE, no
player can increase his payoff by unilaterally changing
her action. While the existence of a unique NE makes
it easier for the players to choose their action, the exis-
tence of multiple NE’s avoids the sharp decision making
process because the players become indifferent between
them. In pure strategies, the type and the number of
NE’s in a game depend on the game. However, due to von
Neumann there is at least one NE when the same game
is played with mixed strategies [1, 2]. Classical game
theory has been successfully tested in decision making
processes encountered in real-life situations ranging from
economics to international relations. By studying and
applying the principles of game theory, one can formu-
late effective strategies, predict the outcome of strategic
situations, select or design the best game to be played,
and determine competitor behavior, as well as the opti-
mal strategy.
In recent years, there have been great efforts to apply
the quantum mechanical toolbox in the design and anal-
ysis of games [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. As
it was the same in other fields such as communication
and computation, quantum mechanics introduced novel
effects into game theory, too. It has proved to have the
potential to affect our way of thinking when approaching
to games and game modelling. Using the physical scheme
proposed by Eisert et al. (see Fig.1) [3], it has been shown
in several games that the dilemma existing in the original
game can be resolved by using the paradigm of quantum
mechanics [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. It has
also been shown that when one of the players chooses
quantum strategies while the other is restricted to classi-
cal ones, the player with quantum strategies can always
receive better payoff if they share a maximally entangled
state [15].
Quantum systems are easily affected by their environ-
ment, and physical schemes are usually far from ideal in
practical situations. Therefore, it is important to study
whether the advantage of the players arising from the
quantum strategies and the shared entanglement survive
in the presence of noise or non-ideal components in the
physical scheme. In this paper, we consider a corrupt
source and analyze its effect on the payoffs and strate-
gies of the players. We search answers for the following
two questions: (i) Is there a critical corruption rate above
which the players cannot maintain their quantum advan-
tage if they are unaware of the action of the noise on the
source, and (ii) How can the players adopt their actions
if they have information on the corruption rate of the
source.
b. Eisert’s scheme: In this physically realizable
scheme the quantum version of a two-player-two-strategy
classical game can be played as follows: (a) A referee
prepares a maximally entangled state by applying an
entangling operator Jˆ on a product state |f〉|g〉 where
{f, g} ∈ {0, 1}. The output of this entangler, which reads
FIG. 1: Physical scheme for playing the quantum version of
classical games. The operations inside the dotted boxes are
performed by the referee.
Jˆ |fg〉 = 1√
2
[ |fg〉+i(−1)(f+g)|(1−f)(1−g)〉 ], is delivered
to the players. (b) The players apply their actions, which
are SU(2) quantum operations locally on their qubits,
and return the resultant state |φ〉out = (UˆA ⊗ UˆB)Jˆ |fg〉
back to the referee. Operators UˆA and UˆB are restricted
to two-parameter SU(2) operators given by
Uˆ =

 e
iφ cos θ2 sin
θ
2
− sin θ2 e−iφ cos θ2

 , (1)
where 0 ≤ φ ≤ π/2 and 0 ≤ θ ≤ π. (c) The referee,
upon receiving this state, applies Jˆ† and then makes a
quantum measurement Πn = |jℓ〉〈jℓ| with n = 2j + ℓ
and j, ℓ ∈ {0, 1}. Then the average payoffs of the players
become
$A =
∑
n
anTr(ΠnJˆ
†ρˆoutJˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pjℓ
$B =
∑
n
bnTr(ΠnJˆ
†ρˆoutJˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pjℓ
(2)
where ρˆout = |φ〉out〈φ|, an and bn are the payoffs chosen
from the classical payoff matrix when the measurement
result is n, and Pjℓ corresponds to the probability of ob-
taining n. The classical version of the game can be played
using the same scheme if the operations corresponding to
the classical pure strategies are chosen as σˆ0 and iσˆy.
Using this scheme, quantum versions of some dilemma-
containing classical games, such as Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD), Samaritan’s Dilemma (SD) and Battle of Sexes
(BoS) whose payoffs matrices are given in Fig.2, have
been studied. In these games, it has been understood
that if the referee starts with the state |fg〉 = |00〉 gen-
erating the entangled state |Ψ〉 = 1√
2
[ |00〉+ i|11〉 ], the
players can resolve their dilemma and receive the highest
possible total payoff $A + $B. It has also been shown
that the dynamics of the games changes when the referee
starts with a different initial state. For example, if the
referee starts with |fg〉 = |01〉 in SD, four NE’s emerge
with the same constant payoff making a solution to the
dilemma impossible [14].
c. Corrupt Source in Quantum Games: As we
have pointed out above, the initial state from which the
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FIG. 2: Payoff matrices for the (I) Prisoner’s dilemma (PD),
(II) Samaritan’s dilemma (SD), and (III) Battle of Sexes
(BoS). These games are 2 × 2 games, that is each of the
two-players- Alice (Column) and Bob (Row)- has two pos-
sible actions. The action sets of the players are: Deny (D)
and Confess (C) in PD; Work (W), Loaf (L), Aid (A), and
No-aid (N) in SD; Ballet (B), and Football (F) in BoS. The
numbers in the parenthesis denote the payoffs received by the
players for their action combinations. The first entry in the
parenthesis is the payoff for Alice, and the second one is that
for Bob.
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FIG. 3: Model of the source for the scheme in Fig. 1. The
rounded rectangle, which includes S1 and S2, is the source to
prepare the initial product state |f〉|g〉. In the ideal source,
each of S1 and S2 deterministically prepares the spin-down
state |0〉. Hence, at each run of the game, the prepared state
is |f〉|g〉 = |0〉|0〉 with probability one. On the other hand, in
the corrupt source, S1 and S2 prepare the spin-up state |1〉
with probability r, and the spin-down state with probability
1− r. Therefore, the input state of the entangler, denoted by
Jˆ , becomes a mixture of spin-up and spin-down states.
referee prepares the entangled state is a crucial parame-
ter in Eisert’s scheme. Therefore, any corruption or de-
viation from the ideality of the source which prepares
this state will change the dynamics and outcomes of the
game. Consequently, the analysis of situations where the
source is corrupt is necessary to shed a light in under-
standing the game dynamics in the presence of imperfec-
tions. We consider the source model shown in Fig. 3.
This model includes two identical sources constructed to
prepare the states |0〉’s which are the inputs to the en-
tangler at each run of the game. These sources are not
ideal and have a corruption rate, r, that is, they pre-
pare the desired state |0〉 with probability (1 − r) while
preparing the unwanted state |1〉 with probability r. The
state prepared by these sources thus can be written as
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FIG. 4: The payoffs received by the players in Prisoner’s
Dilemma as a function of corruption rate, r, for their quan-
tum, Q, and classical, C, strategies. The point labelled as
a at r = 1/2 is the transition from quantum advantage to
classical advantage while the corruption rate increases. The
horizontal dashed line denotes the payoffs of both players for
the classical strategy without corruption.
ρˆ1 = ρˆ2 = (1−r)|0〉〈0|+r|1〉〈1|. Then the combined state
generated and sent to the entangler becomes ρˆ1 ⊗ ρˆ2 =
(1−r)2|00〉〈00|+r2|11〉〈11|+r(1−r)(|01〉〈01|+ |10〉〈10|).
This results in a mixture of the four possible maximally
entangled states (1− r)2|ψ+〉〈ψ+|+ r2|ψ−〉〈ψ−|+ r(1 −
r)(|φ+〉〈φ+| + |φ−〉〈φ−|), where |ψ∓〉 = |00〉 ∓ i|11〉 and
|φ∓〉 = |01〉∓i|10〉. This is the state on which the players
will perform their unitary operators.
Scenario I: In this scenario, the players Alice and
Bob are not aware of the corruption in the source. They
assume that the source is ideal and always prepares the
initial state |fg〉 = |00〉, and hence that the output state
of the entangler is always |ψ+〉. Based on this assump-
tion, they apply the operations that is supposed to re-
solve their dilemma.
We have analyzed PD, SD and BoS according to this
scenario, and compared the payoffs of the players with
respect to the corruption rate. The payoff they receive
when they stick to their quantum strategies are compared
to the payoffs when they play the game classically. We
consider the classical counterparts both with and without
the presence of noise in the game. That is, the players use
the same physical scheme of the quantum version with
and without the corrupt source, and apply their actions
by choosing their operators from the set {σˆ0, iσˆy}.
The results of the analysis according to this scenario
are depicted in Figs. 4-6. A remarkable result of this
analysis is that with the introduction of the corrupt
source, the players’ quantum advantage is no longer pre-
served if the corruption rate, r, becomes larger than a
critical corruption rate r⋆. At r⋆, the classical and quan-
tum strategies produce equal payoffs. Another interest-
ing result is the existence of a strategy UˆA = UˆB =
(σˆ0 + iσˆy)/
√
2, where the payoffs of the players become
constant independent of corruption rate. This strategy
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FIG. 5: The payoffs received by the players in Samaritan’s
dilemma as a function of corruption rate, r, for their quan-
tum, QA, QB, and classical, CA, CB , strategies. The labelled
points are as follows: a, transition point from $A > $B (Case
3 ↔ Case 2 ), b and c at r = 1/2, transitions from quantum
advantage to classical advantage for Bob and Alice, respec-
tively, for increasing corruption rates. The horizontal solid
line denotes the payoff Alice receives in classical strategies
when the source is ideal. For Bob, classical strategies with
and without noise coincide and are depicted with the hori-
zontal dotted line.
could be attractive for risk avoiding and/or paranoid
players.
For PD, which is a symmetric game, the optimal clas-
sical strategies deliver the payoffs $A = $B = 1 for the
actions UˆA = UˆB = iσˆy. In the quantum version with an
uncorrupt source, the players can get the optimal payoffs
$A = $B = 3 if they adopt the strategies UˆA = UˆB = iσˆz
[3]. Hence, the dilemma of the game is resolved and the
players receive better payoffs than those obtained with
classical strategies. However, as seen in Fig. 4, the pay-
offs of players with classical and quantum strategies be-
come equal to 2.25 when r = r⋆ = 1/2. If r satisfies
0 ≤ r < 1/2, the quantum version of the game always
does better than the classical one. Otherwise, the classi-
cal game is better.
When the classical version of PD is played with a
corrupt source, we find that with increasing corruption
rate, while the payoffs for the quantum strategy decrease,
those of the classical one increase. That is, if r > r⋆, then
the players would rather apply their classical strategies
than the quantum ones. This can be explained as follows:
When the players apply classical operations, the game is
played as if there is no entanglement in the scheme. That
is, players apply their classical operators iσˆy on the state
prepared by the source. If the source is ideal, r = 0, they
operate on the |00〉 which results in an output state |11〉.
Referee, upon receiving this output state and making the
projective measurement, delivers $A = $B = 1. On the
other hand, when r = 1, the state from the source is |11〉
and the output state after the players actions becomes
|00〉. With this output state, referee delivers them the
payoffs $A = $B = 3. Thus, when the players apply
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the classical operator iσˆy, their payoffs continuously in-
crease from one to three with the increasing corruption
rate from r = 0 to r = 1.
Using a classical mixed strategy in the asymmetric
game of SD, the players receive ($A, $B) = (−0.2, 1.5)
at the NE. In this strategy, while Alice chooses from
her strategies with equal probabilities, Bob uses a bi-
ased randomization where he applies one of his actions,
σˆ0, with probability 0.2. The most desired solution
to the dilemma in the game is to obtain an NE with
($A, $B) = (3, 2). This is achieved when both players
apply iσˆz to |ψ+〉 [14]. The dynamics of the payoffs in
this game with the corrupt source when the players stick
to their operators iσˆz and its comparison with their clas-
sical mixed strategy are depicted in Fig. 5. Since this
game is an asymmetric one, the payoffs of the players, in
general, are not equal. However, with the corrupt source
it is found that their payoffs become equal at r = 1/7
and at r = 1, where the payoffs are 96/49 and 0, re-
spectively. The critical corruption rate, r⋆ = 1/2, which
denotes the transition from the quantum advantage to
classical advantage regions, is the same for both players.
While for increasing r, $B monotonously decreases from
two to zero, $A reaches its minimum of −0.2 at r = 0.8,
where it starts increasing to the value of zero at r = 1. It
is worth noting that when the players apply their classi-
cal mixed strategies in this physical scheme, $B is always
constant and independent of the corruption rate, whereas
$A increases linearly as $A = −0.2 + 0.9r for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
The payoffs of the players are compared in three cases
[14]: Case 1 : $A ≤ 0 (insufficient solution), Case 2 :
0 < $A ≤ $B (weak solution), and Case 3 : 0 ≤ $B < $A
(strong solution). In the corrupt source scenario in quan-
tum strategies, Case 1 is achieved for 0.6 ≤ r ≤ 1,Case
2 is achieved for 1/7 ≤ r < 0.6, and finally Case 3 for
r < 1/7. The remarkable result of this analysis is that
although the players using quantum strategies have high
potential gains, there is a large potential loss if the source
is deviated from an ideal one. The classical strategies are
more robust to corruption of the source.
In BoS, which is an asymmetric game, the classical
mixed strategies, where Alice and Bob apply σˆ0 with
probabilities 1/3 and 2/3 or vice versa, the players re-
ceive equal payoffs of 2/3. However, the dilemma is not
solved due to the existence of two equivalent NE. On
the other hand, when the physical scheme with quan-
tum strategies is used the players can reach an NE where
their payoffs become $A = 1 and $B = 2 if both play-
ers apply iσˆy to the maximally entangled state prepared
with an ideal source [16]. The advantage of this quan-
tum strategy to the classical mixed strategy is that in
the former $A+$B is higher than the latter. In the pres-
ence of corruption in the source, payoffs of the players
change as shown in Fig. 6. With an ideal source, the
payoffs reads ($A, $B) = (1, 2), however for increasing
corruption rate while $B decreases from two to one, $A
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FIG. 6: The payoffs received by the players in Battle of Sexes
as a function of corruption rate, r, for their quantum, QA, QB,
and classical, C, strategies. For the increasing corruption
rate, the transition from quantum to classical advantage oc-
curs at points labelled as b for r = 0.2 and a for r = 1/2,
respectively, for Alice and Bob. The second transition that is
a transition from the classical to quantum advantage occurs
at a for r = 1/2 and c for r = 0.8, respectively, for Alice and
Bob. The point labelled as a is also the transition point from
$B > $A to $A > $B . The horizontal dotted line corresponds
to the payoffs of the players for their classical strategy when
the source is ideal.
increases from one to two. With an completely corrupt
source, r = 1, the payoffs become ($A, $B) = (2, 1). The
reason for this is the same as explained for PD. When the
quantum strategies with and without corrupt source are
compared to the classical mixed strategy without noise,
it is seen that the former ones always give better pay-
offs to the players. However, when the source becomes
noisy (corrupt), classical strategies become more advan-
tageous to quantum ones with increasing corruption rate.
The range of corruption rate where classical strategies are
better than the quantum strategy if the players stick to
their operations iσˆy, are 0.2 < r < 0.5 and 0.5 < r < 0.8
for Alice and Bob, respectively. When r = 1/2, $A = $B
and these payoffs are equal to the ones received with clas-
sical mixed strategies. While $A = $B independently of
r for classical mixed strategies, $A and $B differ when
the players stick to their quantum strategies for r 6= 1/2.
Another interesting result for this game is that, contrary
to PD and SD, the strategy UˆA = UˆB = (σˆ0 + iσˆy)/
√
2
discussed above always gives a constant payoff (3/4, 3/4),
which is better than that of the classical mixed strategy.
Scenario II: In this scenario, the referee knows the
characteristics of the corruption in the source, and inform
the players on the corruption rate. Then the question is
whether the players can find a unique NE for a known
source with corruption rate r; and if they can, does this
NE resolve their dilemma in the game or not. When
the corruption rate is r = 1/2, the state shared between
the players become ρˆ = Iˆ/4. Then independent of what
action they choose, the players receive constant payoffs
determined by averaging the payoff entries in the clas-
sical game payoff matrices. In this case, the players get
4
r UˆA(θA, φA) UˆB(θB , φB) ($A, $B)
0 (0, pi
2
) (0, pi
2
) (3, 3)
1/4 (0, pi
2
) (0, pi
2
) ( 43
16
, 43
16
)
1/2 (θA, φA)
a (θB, φB)
a ( 9
4
, 9
4
)
3/4 (0, pi
4
) (0, pi
4
) ( 43
16
, 43
16
)
1 (0, pi
4
) (0, pi
4
) (3, 3)
a ∀θA, ∀θB ∈ [0, pi] and ∀φA,∀φB ∈ [0, pi/2]
TABLE I: Strategies which lead to NE’s and the correspond-
ing payoffs for the players in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) if they
are provided the information on the corruption rate, r, of the
source which prepares in the initial product state |0〉|0〉.
r UˆA(θA, φA) UˆB(θB, φB) ($A, $B)
0 (0, pi
2
) (0, pi
2
) (3, 2)
1/4 (0, pi
2
) (0, pi
2
) ( 21
16
, 15
8
)
1/2 (θA, φA)
ab (θB , φB)
ab ( 1
4
, 3
2
)
3/4 (0, φ)b (0, pi
2
− φ)b ( 21
16
, 15
8
)
1 (0, φ)c (0, pi
2
− φ)c (3, 2)
a ∀θA, ∀θB ∈ [0, pi]
b ∀φA, ∀φB ∈ [0, pi/2]
c φ ∈ [0, pi/4]
TABLE II: Strategies which lead to NE’s and the correspond-
ing payoffs for the players in Samaritan’s Dilemma (SD) if
they are provided the information on the corruption rate, r,
of the source which prepares in the initial product state |0〉|0〉.
equal payoffs 9/4 and 3/4 for PD and BoS, respectively.
In SD, the payoffs are $A = 1/4 and $B = 3/2.
For PD, an interesting result is that there is no dif-
ference in the payoffs between an ideal source, r = 0,
and a completely corrupt source, r = 1. That is, the
players can resolve the dilemma receiving the best pos-
sible payoffs, $A = $B = 3, in both cases. However,
the strategies which lead to a unique NE in these two
extreme cases are different: When r = 0, the players
can resolve the dilemma by applying UˆA = UˆB = iσˆz;
however when r = 1, they have to change their actions
to UˆA = UˆB = (σˆ0 + iσˆz)/
√
2 in order to resolve the
dilemma.
For BoS, while an NE is achieved resolving the
dilemma with $A + $B = 3 for both r = 0 and r = 1,
the corruption rate shows its effect in the payoffs and
the actions to reach NE’s. When r = 0, the payoffs are
($A, $B) = (1, 2), on the other hand when r = 1, payoffs
become ($A, $B) = (2, 1). As can be seen in Table III,
the difference in the strategies is the choice of φA and φB;
while for r = 1 the players should choose φA = φB = 0 to
arrive at the NE, for r = 0 they have an infinite number
of choices for φA and φB and any of these choices will
work equally well.
The effect of a corrupt source is much stronger for the
r UˆA(θA, φA) UˆB(θB, φB) ($A, $B)
0 (θ, φ)a (θ, pi
2
− φ)a (1, 2)
(pi,φA)
b (pi, φB)
b (1, 2)
1/4 (θ, φ)a (θ, pi
2
− φ)a ($′A, $
′
B)
(pi,φA)
b (pi, φB)
b ( 11
16
, 19
16
)
1/2 (θA, φA)
bc (θB, φB)
bc ( 3
4
, 3
4
)
3/4 (pi, 0) (pi, 0) ( 19
16
, 11
16
)
1 (pi, 0) (pi, 0) (2, 1)
a θ ∈ [pi/2, pi] and φ ∈ [0, pi/2]
b ∀φA, ∀φB ∈ [0, pi/2]
c ∀θA, ∀θB ∈ [0, pi]
TABLE III: Strategies which lead to NE’s and the corre-
sponding payoffs for the players in BoS if they are pro-
vided the information on the corruption rate of the source
which prepares in the initial product state |0〉|0〉. Note that
one of the sets of strategies leading to NE’s when r = 1/4
gives payoffs depending on θ. These payoffs are as follows:
$′A = (13− 2 cos(2θ))/16 and $′B = (20− cos(2θ))/16.
SD game. In this game, in contrast to the other two,
although for r = 0 there is a unique NE solving the
dilemma, for r = 1 the players cannot find a unique NE.
There emerges an infinite number of different strategies
with equal payoffs (3, 2). The players are indifferent be-
tween these strategies and cannot make sharp decisions.
Therefore, the dilemma of the game survives, although
its nature changes.
When we look at some intermediate values for the cor-
ruption rate, we see that corruption rate affects BoS and
SD strongly. For example, when r = 3/4 in SD, there
are infinite number of strategies and NE’s which have
the same payoffs (21/16, 15/8). These NE’s are achieved
when the players choose their operators as θA = θB = 0
and φB = −φA + π/2. The same is seen in BoS for
r = 1/4 which results in a payoff (15/16, 21/16) when
the players choose θA = θB = π/2 and φB = −φA+ π/2.
A more detailed analysis carried out for PD with increas-
ing r in steps of 0.1 in the range [0, 1] has revealed that
the players can achieve a unique NE where their payoffs
and strategies depends on the corruption rate. Therefore,
information on the source characteristic might help the
players to reorganize their strategies. However, whether
providing the players with this kind of information in a
game is acceptable or not is an open question.
d. Conclusion: This study shows that the strate-
gies to achieve NE’s and the corresponding payoffs are
strongly dependent on the corruption of the source. In
a game with corrupt source, the quantum advantage no
longer survives if the corruption rate is above a critical
value. The corruption may not only cause the emergence
of multiple NE’s but may cause a decrease in the player’s
payoff, as well, even if there is a single NE. If the players
are given the characteristics of the source then they can
adapt their strategies; otherwise they can either continue
5
their best strategy assuming that the source is ideal and
take the risk of losing their quantum advantage over the
classical or choose a risk-free strategy, which makes their
payoff independent of the corruption rate. However, in
the case where players know the corruption rate and ad-
just their strategies, the problem is that for some games
there emerge multiple NE’s, therefore the dilemmas in
those games survive. This study reveals the importance
of the source used in a quantum game.
The authors thank to Dr. J. Soderholm for the critical
reading of the manuscript. They also acknowledge the
insightful discussions with Dr. F. Morikoshi and Dr. T.
Yamamoto.
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